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IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY CONSUMER SERVICES, INC., 
a New Jersey Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
VERA HESS PETERS 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No, 880453 
Priority No. 14(b) 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT 
Respondent, City Consumer Services, Inc., respectfully 
submits this Supplemental Brief to the Court. 
INTRODUCTION 
Respondent was awarded summary judgment on its suit to 
recover on an obligation evidenced by a promissory note. 
Appellant brought this appeal alleging error on the part of the 
trial court in granting summary judgment and awarding fees and 
costs to respondent. Both parties briefed the issues; 
however, no oral argument has yet been allowed. On May 3, 
1990, the Court issued a decision reversing the trial court and 
directing that respondent's complaint be dismissed. The basis 
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stated for the Court's decision was that respondent had failed 
to bring its action within the three month period required by 
section 57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated. On May 15, 1990, the 
Court recalled the decision issued on May 3, 1990. At the 
request of both parties, the Court has allowed the filing of 
supplemental briefs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Argument that Section 57-1-32 Applies to a 
Junior Lienholder Whose Collateral Has Been Lost Is 
Inconsistent with the Plain Language of the Statute and 
Weil-Established Precedent of the Court. 
The Court's recalled decision centered on an 
application of section 57-1-32. Section 57-1-32 provides: 
At any time within three months after 
any sale of property under a trust deed, as 
hereinabove provided, an action may be 
commenced to recover the balance due upon 
the obligation for which the trust deed was 
given as security, and in such action the 
complaint shall set forth the entire amount 
of the indebtedness which was secured by 
such trust deed, the amount for which such 
property was sold, and the fair market value 
thereof at the date of sale. Before 
rendering judgment, the court shall find the 
fair market value at the date of sale of the 
property sold. The court may not render 
judgment for more than the amount by which 
the amount of the indebtedness with 
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, 
including trustee's and attorneys fees, 
exceeds the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the sale. In any 
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action brought under this section, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to 
collect its costs and reasonable attorneys 
fees incurred in bringing an action under 
this section, 
(Emphasis added.) 
As the emphasized phrases plainly indicate, and as 
pointed out succinctly by the Utah Court of Appeals in G. Adams 
Ltd. Partnership v. Durbano, 782 P.2d 962 (Utah App. 1989), 
this section governs a deficiency action brought by a holder of 
a note secured by a trust deed after the holder has completed a 
non-judicial foreclosure under the trust deed. It was never 
intended to apply to the holder of a note without collateral or 
to a holder of a note whose collateral was eliminated through 
no fault of the holder. 
The plain language of the statute is that "any sale of 
property under a^  trust deed" commences the period for bringing 
an action on the "obligation for which the trust deed was given 
as security." The complaint for such an action must set forth 
the "amount of the indebtedness secured by such trust deed." 
Only a distorted reading of the statute supports its 
application to respondent's action on a note. For the statute 
to take on the meaning found in the Court's recalled decision 
would, at the very least, require the addition of the word 
"any" before the words "trust deed" in the second line. Absent 
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that addition, the statute clearly applies only to a holder of 
a note who foreclosed non-judicially on the trust deed securing 
the note. 
Further evidence of the fact that section 57-1-32 
applies only to a holder of a note who has foreclosed 
non-judicially on the trust deed securing the note can be found 
in the second and third sentences of the section. If the 
section was intended to require the holder of any note secured 
by a trust deed to bring a deficiency action within three 
months after the foreclosure of any other holder's trust deed 
on the same property, the present language concerning the fair 
market value and the amount of the indebtedness would make no 
sense. 
Respondent brought suit against appellant under the 
terms of its promissory note. Its collateral having been lost, 
respondent was not governed by the "one-action" rule found in 
section 78-37-1, Utah Code Annotated. Lockhart Co. v. 
Equitable Realty Co., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983); Utah Mortgage 
and Loan Co. v. Black, 618 P.2d 43 (Utah 1980), Cache Valley 
Banking Co. v. Logan, 56 P.2d 1046 (1936). In Cache Valley, 
the Court stated: 
... where the security has been lost through 
no fault of the mortgagee, an action may be 
maintained directly upon the personal 
obligation evidenced by the note without 
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going through the idle and fruitless 
procedure of foreclosure. 
56 P.2d at 1049. 
As a result of appellant's breach of her obligation to 
a senior lienholder, a foreclosure sale eliminated Respondent's 
security. Accordingly, as a holder of a note in default, 
respondent was entitled to sue on the note at any time within 
the applicable statute of limitations. Respondent did not 
predicate its claim for appellant's liability under the Note on 
section 57-1-32.1 
The Court's recalled decision stated that appellant 
argued that respondent's action was time-barred by section 
57-1-32: 
Peters filed her opposition to the motion 
and her own motion to dismiss, arguing that 
CCS did not bring its suit under the 
one-action rule, Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 
(1987), and failed to bring a deficiency 
action under section 57-1-32 within three 
months after the foreclosure sale. 
Slip Opinion at 2. 
lrrhe only reference to section 57-1-32 by respondent was for 
purposes of analogy in supporting its claim for attorney fees. 
Respondent was entitled to its fees under the express terms of 
the note. 
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That statement was wrong. Appellant did not contend 
that respondent's claim was barred by the three month 
limitation. Appellant relied on section 57-1-32 for the 
limited purpose of arguing that it required respondent to 
either cure the senior lien default and conduct its own 
foreclosure or take action to bid at the senior lien 
foreclosure sale. Only thereafter, argued appellant, could 
respondent seek a deficiency, if any. Nowhere did appellant 
suggest that plaintiff's suit was barred for failure to be 
brought within three months after the foreclosure sale under 
the senior lien. (See Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13.) 
The Court repeatedly cited to Concepts, Inc. v. First 
Security Realty, 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1986) in support of its 
recalled decision. The Court's reliance was misplaced. 
As the Durbano decision clearly states, the Concepts 
case involved an attempt by the holder of a trust deed to hold 
a second foreclosure sale in order to avail itself of the 
deficiency action under section 57-1-32. The Concepts case did 
not involve a junior lienholder seeking to recover on its note 
after its collateral was lost by the foreclosure of a senior 
lien. Rather, it dealt with an effort by a senior lienholder 
to get around the three month limitation period after 
discovering that it failed to bring a timely action after 
foreclosing its trust deed. Concepts does not support the 
Court's recalled decision. In fact, as noted in Durbano: 
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The [Concepts] opinion merely observes in 
passing that section 57-1-32 "requires an 
action to recover the balance due upon the 
obligation for which the trust deed was 
given as security to be commenced within 
three months after the sale of the property 
under the trust deed. 
782 P.2d at 964. It has nothing to say about the situation of 
a junior lienholder suing on a note after its collateral is 
eliminated. 
II. The Court's Recalled Decision Would Create 
Dangerous Loopholes That Could be Used to Defeat the Interests 
of Legitimate Lienholders. 
The Court's recalled decision contains the following 
statement: 
The law is equally applicable to all 
trust deed holders whether in a senior or 
junior position, and an action for a 
deficiency judgment after any sale of 
property under a trust deed must be brought 
within the strictures of section 57-1-32. 
Slip Opinion at 3-4. A literal application of this statement 
would serve, in many cases, to penalize innocent parties and 
allow those with legitimate obligations to escape 
responsibility for those obligations. 
There are numerous examples of the "mischief" that 
could result from the Court's recalled decision. One of those 
examples is given in the Durbano decision. The junior 
lienholder whose note is kept current during the foreclosure of 
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a senior lien may not be able to accelerate its own 
obligation. It would, then, be faced with the choice of either 
losing its ability to recover a deficiency or expending funds 
to cure or payoff the senior lien, without the ability to 
foreclose its own lien. Other examples are equally troublesome. 
Consider a trust deed borrower who sells his home to 
another individual and receives, as a part of the 
consideration, a "wrap-around" second trust deed and note. If 
the home declines in value (a real possibility, as the past few 
years have demonstrated) and the purchaser fails to pay on the 
second note, the borrower/holder of the second note could 
foreclose on the second trust deed and continue paying the 
senior lienholder for three months after foreclosing on the 
second. Then, the borrower/holder could discontinue paying on 
the obligation to the senior lien holder without risk of a 
deficiency claim. This is possible without notice to the 
holder of the senior obligation! 
Yet another example would involve a lender which makes 
a business loan, requires a guarantee of its repayment, and the 
guaranty is secured by a junior lien on the guarantor's home. 
It is entirely conceivable that a senior lienholder could 
foreclose on the guarantor's home at a time when the business 
loan is not in default. The lender is faced with the dilemma 
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of either advancing funds to cure or payoff the senior lien or 
losing its right to pursue the guaranty if the business loan is 
not paid. 
Surely the statute was not intended to give these 
results. Yet, the language of the Court's recalled decision, 
strictly applied, leads to that conclusion. 
Ill. The Negative Implications of the Court's Recalled 
Decision on Financial Institutions and Individuals Holding 
Trust Deeds Warrants the Benefit of Oral Argument. 
Rule 29, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides, 
in part: 
a. In General. Oral argument will be allowed 
in all cases unless the Court concludes: 
(1) The appeal is frivolous; or 
(2) The dispositive issue or set of issues 
has been recently authoritatively decided; or 
(3) The facts and legal arguments are 
adeguately presented in the briefs and record and 
the decisional process would not be significantly 
aided by oral argument. 
The Court issued its recalled Per Curiam decision in 
this case without the benefit of oral argument. The basis for 
the Court's decision, i.e., that respondent's Complaint is 
time-barred, was not advanced by the appellant. It was not 
addressed in either party's brief. 
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Given the possibility of significant departure from 
existing law (see Durbano), the Court should seek the benefit 
of oral argument. In addition, the Court should consider the 
benefits of allowing any interested entities or individuals to 
address the issue raised by the Court in amicus curiae briefs. 
Respondent's counsel has been contacted by several groups and 
individuals interested in filing amicus curiae briefs. 
IV. The Appellant Waived Her Right to Assert a 
Defense Based Upon the Limitations Period in Section 57-1-32. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure ("U.R.C.P.") 8(c) 
provides that a responsive pleading must set forth any matter 
"constituting an avoidance or an affirmative defense." Rule 
12(h), U.R.C.P., provides that a party "waives all defenses . . 
. which [he or she] does not present either by motion . . . or 
. . . in [his or her] answer or reply. . . . " 
"The statute of limitations defense must be pleaded as 
an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading or it is 
waived." Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Company, 
664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983). 
The use of the limitations period found in section 
57-1-32 to bar respondent's claim would certainly constitute an 
"affirmative defense", as it bars liability not because the 
facts don't entitle respondent to judgment, but because 
respondent's claim is time-barred. To preserve that defense, 
appellant should have raised it in her responsive pleadings at 
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the trial level. Having failed to do so, she has waived the 
right to argue it now. 
V. Defenses Not Raised Below Cannot be Considered 
for the First Time on Appeal. 
The Court's recalled decision was based on an 
application of the 3 month statute of limitations found in 
section 57-1-32. The appellant never asserted that defense in 
her pleadings. She never raised the defense in argument before 
the trial court. She never even raised the issue in her brief 
filed with this Court. 
Appellant's only reliance on section 57-1-32 can be 
found on pages 12 and 13 of appellant's brief. There, 
appellant cites section 57-1-32 for the proposition that 
respondent was not entitled to a deficiency judgment because 
the value of the property on the date of the sale exceeded the 
amount of the indebtedness. The appellant never argued below 
that the three month limitation in section 57-1-32 bars the 
respondent's claim. 
It would be error for this Court to decide this case 
on an issue not raised at trial or in the pleadings. Matters 
not raised in the pleadings or at trial cannot be considered 
for the first time on appeal. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 
944 (Utah 1987); Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 
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758 (Utah 1984); Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 
1983); and Villeneuve v. Schamanek, 639 P.2d 214 (Utah 1981). 
In both Bangerter and Villeneuve, the Court upheld summary 
judgments in favor of respondents, citing this long-standing 
rule. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS IN RESPONDENT'S 
ORIGINAL BRIEF 
Summary judgment was properly granted be Low where the 
record establishes that the facts were uncontroverted. 
Respondent filed a memorandum setting forth fifteen undisputed 
material facts supporting its motion for summary judgment. 
Additionally, respondent filed the affidavit of Kathleen 
Hackett, the person then responsible for the delinquent account 
of appellant. Hackett stated that after reviewing the 
appraisal of the property's value, the amounts due on the 
existing liens and the carrying costs and costs of 
reconditioning and marketing, respondent decided not to bid at 
the senior lienholder's foreclosure sale. 
Omitted citations can be found in respondent's original 
brief. 
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Appellant failed to file opposing affidavits. Utah 
case law requires opposing affidavits to avoid summary judgment 
where the moving party has established facts supporting a 
summary disposition of the case. By failing to controvert the 
facts established by Kathleen Hacketfs affidavit, appellant 
left the lower court to decide only whether respondent was 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Even assuming 
arguendo, that some facts were in dispute, there were no 
material issues of fact precluding the lower court from 
granting respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Respondent was entitled to Summary Judgment as a 
Matter of law. Respondent's claim does not violate the 
"One-Action Rule". The facts are undisputed that respondent 
did not use up the security. It also did not release the 
security, Rather, the evidence supports the trial court's 
conclusion: 
That rule [the one-action rule] is not 
applicable in this case, There was a 
senior lien foreclosure of the property 
on June 22, 1987. The plaintiff did 
not bid at the sale because it made the 
judgment that there was not an economic 
justification for doing so. After the 
sale there was no property to foreclose 
on. The plaintiff was not required to 
go through a fruitless procedure. 
Uncontroverted evidence establishes that the "One-Action Rule" 
is inapplicable because the senior lienholder foreclosed, 
eliminating respondent's interest. 
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Even assuming, arguendo, that the "One-Action Rule" is 
applicable, the evidence establishes that the exception to the 
"One-Action Rule" is controlling in this case. The purpose of 
the rule is to protect debtors from multitudinous lawsuits. 
That protection is unnecessary and the rule is inapplicable 
when the security has been lost or disposed of without fault or 
blameworthy conduct on the part of the creditor. The facts 
clearly establish that the senior lienholder foreclosed, and 
eliminated respondent's junior lien. Respondent then initiated 
this action to recover on the debt. Respondent eLected not to 
bid at the foreclosure sale due to its belief that there was no 
"real" equity remaining for it to satisfy the Note. Respondent 
engaged in a careful review of the situation and made a 
reasonable decision under the circumstances. Surely those 
actions could not be considered as fault or blameworthy conduct. 
The trial court properly awarded fees and costs to 
respondent. The parties stipulated to the costs to be included 
in the judgment, and the lower court heard evidence and 
adjusted an hourly billing rate in making a determination on 
the reasonableness of the claimed attorneys* fees. The facts 
clearly show that the trial court carefully weighed all the 
facts and circumstances in awarding costs and fee's. Absent a 
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clear abuse of discretion, this court should not disturb the 
trial court's judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The uncontroverted facts before the lower court 
warranted its entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
respondent. The Court erred in rendering its recalled 
decision. To avoid continuing error and to avoid the undesired 
results permitted by that decision, the Court should affirm the 
lower court's decision. 
DATED this 1st day of August, 1990. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
B y ,1 j * ^ * ^ ^ 
J . ffco6t Lundtferg 
At torneys for Respond 
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